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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The French and Dutch “no” against the proposed EU-constitution has many aspects of being a revolution. If it 
is a fiscal revolution, a better fiscal constitution as part of the total constitution could be the solution. A typical 
EU-constitution, bearing on the European cultural and political diversity and spread of knowledge among 
individuals and businesses, must offer the maximum of freedom for national authorities, individual citizens and 
businesses: a limited government. A fundamental separation over different authorities of the competences 
regarding the determination of fiscal rules and the power to make policy within the boundaries of those rules 
could be the answer. Instead of, as was proposed in the draft of the EU-constitution, to decide democratically 
about the both of them together. The last is also the practice in today’s European Parliament and European 
Commission. In due course the separate “taxation chamber” can grow into an organ where all legislation in the 
EU is made independently of the direct use thereof in concrete policies. In this way businesses in order to 
succeed have to compete since no special favors can be got by lobbying at the EU.   
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
  
After the French and Dutch voted “no” against the proposed European constitution in two referenda in 
2005 to speak of a (revised) fiscal constitution of the EU does not seem to be a priority. It seems more opportune 
first to look at the general lines for possible cooperation between countries; the fiscal constitution is a point of 
later care. If, however, the “no” of the French and Dutch citizens is a revolution, the truth counts also that at least 
halve of all revolutions in world history were fiscal revolutions (Nef, 2002, pp. 42-43). A fiscal constitution 
takes center stage.   
 
It is telling that it is the fiscal policy regarding the decrease in the amount of the Dutch contribution to 
the EU-budget and the income support of the EU for French farmers on which both authorities do have to hold 
the line to please their citizens. The situation regarding the stability pact is just as illustrative. The 3% EU-norm 
of a maximum allowed budget deficit is in fact a standard that no longer needs to be observed and, if observed, 
has lost its beneficial effect. With the recently revised rules of the stability pact you can always get away with a 
larger deficit. Larger deficits are allowed if they are temporarily, are exceptional, caused by an economic 
recession or have not been created by government policies. Moreover, the 3% EU-norm broken by, e.g., France 
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and Germany openly and Greece and Italy secretly, without punishment by the EU, has lost all positive 
influence. It is as by raising kids. To say, “O.K, just for once”, is fatal. A better fiscal constitution, also, becomes 
a priority and can direct a general reform of the EU-constitution in order to secure cooperation between 
countries.  
 
In short, thought the Dutch and French government both do pretend that nothing has happened, yet here 
too rules the historical wisdom that authorities are free to the extent that people can overthrow her. From that 
point of view the North-Korean authorities do have all the freedom of the world. For the Chinese authorities, 
however, the power did shift in recent years to the other side of the spectrum. The Dutch and French authorities 
are still further at that other side. To speak of a fiscal revolution also, does not seem to be to far-fetched. We 
answer three questions. What basic value is the guiding value of Europe? A value every constitution has to 
incorporate. What form of constitution does follow and hence which reform of the EU-constitution is necessary?  
 
 
MEN DIFFER IN PREFERENCES AND KNOWLEDGE 
 
 
 Why does the EU-constitution have individual freedom as one of its basic values? Indeed, it is a good in 
itself. And hence does give rise to institutions such as the rule of law with its universal and nondiscriminatory 
application; universal and open franchise; and separation of powers. This means guaranteed protection of person, 
property, and contract; periodic elections with open entry into competition for political office; and constitutional 
limits on the extent of governmental action (Buchanan, 2005, p. 1). Individual freedom, however, is also a 
necessity for our economic order: the market economy. After all, not only, quite visible, the climate and the 
physical characteristics of the different countries in the EU do differ, but, less visible, though of more 
importance, also men in their preferences and knowledge do differ. The problem, and the strong point of a 
market economy, as has been emphasized by the Austrian-born economist Friedrich Hayek, is to make an 
optimal use of those differences in knowledge (Hayek, 1982, Vol. 1).  
 
 Hence the problem in a market economy is not to give the central authorities, be it Brussels or a local 
government, all the knowledge it needs to pursue a certain policy. The problem is to give each individual all the 
extra knowledge he needs, mostly in the form of price signals, so he can decide for himself how to pursue his 
own goals. In this way society does make use of often unique knowledge of local circumstances and preferences 
that do differ in time. Knowledge that is difficult to centralize. Individuals often do not explicitly know that they 
do have a certain knowledge or skill before the need arises to actively use it in a certain situation which is of 
particular interest to them. 
  
 
AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 
 
 
 Let us first expand on the knowledge that is needed in a market economy. In other words we are looking at 
the core of Austrian economics. A form of economic thinking that indeed started in Austria but has presently its 
main advocates in the US. In Austrian economics knowledge dissemination and the discovery thereof takes 
center stage. In 1871 Carl Menger's (an Austrian born economist living in Vienna) value theory turned the value 
theory of the classical economists upside down. The classical (Ricardian) theory held that cost of production 
determines the normal value of consumption goods. In contrast, Menger's theory held that the value of 
consumption goods ultimately determines the cost of production. Value is an expression of judgments concern-
ing future usefulness in meeting consumer wants. Prices do not measure the value of a good, they do express it. 
Hence does follow one of the Austrian fundamentals of taxation, “No tax can be shifted forward”. Prices, as we 
just said, are never determined by costs of production; the reverse is true. Think of it. There is no reason to 
expect the producer to wait on, e.g., a general sales tax to increase his prices if he could have done so before. 
Since the selling price is already set at a “maximum”; a rise in costs, e.g., an imposed general sales tax cannot 
raise the price any further. The price is determined by the total stock in existence and the demand schedule for it 
on the market. Hence the fact that the sticker price of a product does show a certain amount of sales tax does not 
prove that it is shifted forward towards the consumer. The price for the producer for a good on the market is not 
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the market price minus the sales tax. It is just that market price. The price minus the sales tax the producer gets 
might well have been reduced to allow for the payment of taxes. So it makes the income the producer receives 
less. Hence a sales tax is an income tax on the production factors (Rothbard, 1970, pp. 88-93).  
 
 Israel Kirzner describes modern Austrianism as an authentic extension of Menger's older static subjec-
tivism: a consequent dynamic subjectivism. In modern Austrianism, the two central figures are Ludwig von 
Mises and Friedrich Hayek. Both authors focus on market adjustment processes. Kirzner, building his theory as 
Mises and Hayek did, believes that one of the greatest failures of neoclassical (equilibrium) analysis is that it 
assumes equilibrium (the equilibrium price in demand and supply) is actually brought about. The real problem 
for modern Austrians is to describe the possible realization of an equilibrium as the result of "the systematic way 
in which plan revisions are made as a consequence of the disappointment of earlier plans" (Kirzner, 1962, p. 
381).  
 
 Mises and Hayek made it possible to describe adjustment as a systematic sequence of decisions. Mises's 
extension of subjectivism was to describe the individual decision unit not only as maximizing, but also as finding out 
the relevant ends-means relationship. This opened the way for incorporating learning into our understanding of 
market processes. Hayek's extension of subjectivism was to describe the process as one of learning by discovery. 
Endogenous change in the ends-means relationship—says Kirzner—is possible with the entrepreneurial element in 
each individual market participant: alertness. Alertness is "the propensity [...] toward fresh goals and the discovery of 
hitherto unknown resources" (1973, p. 34). A disequilibrium situation points to market ignorance. From it emerge 
profitable opportunities that are exploited by alertness. Alertness gives a more realistic image of human action (and 
hence real choice) and makes possible the description of the market as a unified discovery process. "[The] ‘alertness’ 
view of the entrepreneurial role rejects the thesis that if we attribute genuine novelty to the entrepreneur, we must 
necessarily treat entrepreneurially generated market events as not related to earlier market events in any systematic 
way. The genuine novelty [...] attribute[d] to the entrepreneur consists in his spontaneous discovery of the 
opportunities marked out by earlier market conditions (or by future market conditions as they would be in the 
absence of his own actions)" […] "[These] entrepreneurial discoveries are the steps through which any possible 
tendency toward market equilibrium must proceed" (Kirzner, 1985, pp. 11-12).  
 
In the last centuries the goal of a market economy in which everyone aims at his own interests and uses 
his own knowledge has been a basic economic value in Europe. For James Buchanan this is all a part of the 
superiority of the Western value system (Buchanan, 2005, p. 1). In the 19e century John Stuart Mill already 
wrote, “it is now recognized, though not till after a long struggle, that both the cheapness and the good quality of 
commodities are most effectively provided for by leaving the producers and sellers perfectly free, under the sole 
check of equal freedom to the buyers for supplying themselves elsewhere” ([1859],1974, p. 164). John Maynard 
Keynes spoke in similar words a century later, “The advantage to efficiency of the decentralization of decisions 
and individual responsibility is even greater, perhaps, than the nineteenth century supposed; and the reaction 
against the appeal to self-interest may have gone too far” ([1937], 1964, p. 380).  
 
 
A CONSTITUTION BASED ON A PRINCIPLID LIMITATION 
OF TASKS  
 
 
If freedom of choice and free initiative of citizens is the rule, a constitution must contain a principle-
based limitation of the role of government in society. This limitation should be two-fold. First, a limitation of the 
tasks the government can do and second a limitation on the way fiscal policy is to be decided.  
 
For the first we can look at the constitution of the U.S. If the problem is how to establish a limited 
government, for the citizens in the U.S. two authorities are of interest: the authorities in each of the states and the 
federal government in Washington. Is that not too much government? No, not if both authorities compete with 
each other in the sense that they each have their branch of power. A branch, supported by a constitution, and 
hence can be guarded. As has been said by James Madison, one of the founders of the American constitution, in 
the U.S. constitution the central authorities do have little and limited and the states do have many and large 
competences (Carson, 1983; cp. Markman, 2005). The former has powers related to foreign policy and national 
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defense. The latter has powers related to the criminal justice system and the protection of the family. In the 
proposed EU-constitution, however, the opposite seems to be the case: there seems to be little that does not fall 
under the jurisdiction of Brussels. The proposed constitution describes tasks that the EU has to do under all 
circumstances (e.g., customs, competition and monetary policy, fishing, trade and the internal market policy), 
tasks that can be appropriated if necessary (e.g., environmental policy and consumer protection) and tasks the 
EU supports (e.g., tourism).  
 
But power wants more power, all to the good or to the bad. Every possibility, how artificially, will be 
used to enlarge it. Even by an explicitly described small task for the (federal) central authorities, as described by 
the U.S constitution, there are many examples thereof. According to the US-constitution, for instance, interstate 
trade is a task of the federal authorities. Just as the EU-authorities do have a stake in border crossing interests. 
That, however, is a license for government involvement in approximately everything. Look at what did happen 
in the US. The federal authorities may not meddle with agriculture in the separate states. Yet---with the rule and 
power of the authority over interstate trade in hand---it states how many acres in the separate states have to 
remain wasted. How can the federal authorities motivate this? A farmer did grow grain on his “wasted” land and 
fed the grain to his cattle. No interstate trade you would say. But did the Supreme Court argue if the farmer did 
not had grown grain on his wasted land, he would have bought it. Also he influenced the price of grain on the 
market and so interstate trade (Snyder, 1998).  
 
In general, think of federalism in the US as (1) the division of powers of government between the 
national government and the states. (2) the separation of powers in which each branch of the national 
government---the legislative, the executive, and the judicial branch---has distinct responsibilities, yet is subject 
to the checks and balances of the other branches. And (3) there is the principle of limited government in which 
the national government is constrained to exercise only those powers set forth by the constitution (Markman, 
2005, p. 2).  
In short, however, even if there is a clear separation of tasks as in the US, central government often 
grabs the possibility to enlarge its powers. What then to expect of a description of tasks in the proposed EU-
constitution? Tasks that, in principle, are many and are (badly) held in control in a democratic decision-making 
process? A process in which everyone thinks that other people do pay for a certain policy and changing 
majorities have to be bought, time and again, with new money to spend. An ever increasing government budget 
might be expected.   
 
 
POLITICAL AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES 
 
 
Next for economic reasons, cultural and political reasons too make it difficult to have a fiscal 
constitution in the sense of a democratic process. Fiscal policy and democracy are hard to reconcile. It is an 
almost impossible combination to ask for. In the middle of the previous century Hayek (1939; cf. Hayek 1949, 
pp. 255-72) wrote that democracy can only under very restricted conditions be transposed to a supra-national 
organization. A little later his American counter-ego Milton Friedman said the same. If you apply both ideas to 
the situation in Europe we have to conclude that the EU is not only missing the necessary homogeneity to form 
clear policy goals in a democratic way, but it misses as well the stimuli not to waste the money of the EU.  
 
Why is it hard to expect concrete policy goals and fiscal constraint from the European parliament---the 
most democratic institution there is in the EU? Of course, very general objectives (e.g., prosperity for everyone) 
will be easy to agree on. After that, however, it becomes difficult. Concrete objectives will be difficult to 
formulate. The countries of the EU differ too much in culture, history and economic development. Every choice 
supposes a balancing of the pros and cons. The service directive of the EU is an example thereof. The recently 
weakened service directive is supposed to show the social face of the EU. No worker from Eastern Europe, 
however, will be glad with that revised one that should “protect” him from himself. Within a relatively 
homogeneous country like the Netherlands, however, the original directive would be no problem. Every plumber 
from the north of the Netherlands is welcome in the south. Likewise the Netherlands is supporting with a low 
price of gas a national pride: the agriculture of vegetables in greenhouses in the west of the country. Every 
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Dutchman is willing to pay for it. But the very same solidarity for a Spanish national pride is something 
completely different. And the other way around!  
 
The solidarity that is necessary for concrete policy is within the EU very tenuous. Even within one 
country if things do differ like language (Belgium), religion (North-Ireland) or economic development (North 
and South-Italy) solidarity is hard to find. All of these situations do characterize the situation within the 
European parliament. Hence, of an (in the future) democratically chosen Chinese parliament with its 
approximately 3000 members we can expect more priority setting then by the 700 members of the European 
parliament. China with its fifty minorities but overwhelming majority of almost 95 per cent Han-Chinese is more 
a unity then the 25 members of EU are.  
 
If a parliament can give no objectives for administration and, hence, also cannot meaningfully be asked 
for advice, the European Commission remains de facto the administration. Often below the guise that it concerns 
only a technical affair. But that is hard to maintain. Over a change in policy, no matter how technically it does 
look like, the parliament belongs to decide. Moreover also the Commission has to do with the various wishes of 
countries that do make up the members of the Commission.  
 
Large countries, however, will never transfer their economic power to Brussels. The course of events 
around the reformation of the stabilization pact in the EU is characteristic thereof. It is naïve to expect the same 
reforms if a few small countries had broken the rules. Therefore it is to be expected the rule, as proposed in the 
constitution, that if at least ten countries with 65 per cent of the EU-population do agree, a proposal is accepted, 
will be violated if it should be of a disadvantage to large countries.  
 
The EU, also, has hardly any incentives not to waste money. The best guarantee not to waste money is 
that the same person both owns and does spend the money (Friedman, [1979], 1981, p. 146). You loan on the 
penny and sees to it that you do get value for your money. Members of parliaments or commission members, 
however, do spend others men’s money, on behave of, often again, other men. That is almost a guarantee for 
ineffective and inefficient spending. Of each member of a local parliament some restraint in spending the 
taxpayers’ money of his own citizens can be expected. But what to think of an Eastern-European member of the 
EU-parliament who does spend the money of West-European taxpayers at projects in Eastern-Europe? To satisfy 
the members of parlement of Western-European countries pork-barrel legislation will rise. Not much different as 
is presently the case in the US. Often the support of congressmen of several states has to be bought with financial 
presents (pet projects) for their local constituents. In short, we will see more signs along the roads which state, 
“This project has been realized with the help of the EU”. A project, if the country had to decide and pay for 
itself, it would not have spent the money on.  
 
The referendum over the EU-constitution had also nothing to do with a choice for or against a more 
liberal or more socialist Europe. The whole point was that policies no matter how good its intentions, that are 
certainly possible for each of the countries separately, are no option for the totality of the EU. Europe lacks the 
necessary homogeneity; priorities cannot be set. To transfer authority and hence policy to Brussels has its limits. 
The pause that has arisen after the refusal of the EU-constitution can become the most fertile period in the 
history of the EU. A 'no' against the constitution forces authorities to come up with a fiscal alternative.   
 
 
SEPARATION OF POWERS: DETERMINATION OF VERSUS 
TO ACT WITHIN FISCAL LAWS 
 
 
These days fiscal decision-making is mostly based on the rule that policies have to pose as little 
resistance as possible for the majority that must approve of them. The feeling, often, dominates that someone 
else pays (Spicer, 1995). In the last four years no member of the US congress had on total voted for a reduction 
in government outlays. Notwithstanding that the rhetoric to speak of fiscal discipline was on the rise (Dircksen, 
2005). Ever growing government tasks and a growing government budget and corresponding taxation are the 
result. Besides, it is most likely that “rates of government spending will always be higher than the revenue from 
the taxes legislatures are willing to impose on their constituents” (Buchanan, 2005, p. 2). This since decisions on 
©Copyright 2006 by the Global Business and Technology Association 
the spending side of the budget are to be made independently of the decisions on the taxing side. If, however, the 
problem is to carry over tasks to supranational authorities, as is the case in the EU-constitution, we do feel best 
protected if these supranational authorities only can act on the basis of a fiscal framework stated by yet another 
organ (Nef, 2002). 
 
Which reformation of the EU-constitution is necessary? According to Hayek there has to be established 
an authority that states the fiscal rules separately from one that within those rules does administrate (Hayek, 
1982, Vol. 3, pp. 126-127). The EU, therefore, cannot have a constitution in which the process of democratic 
decision-making is paramount. A constitution must do more then just indicate how countries and citizens 
democratically have to come to a decision: if certain constitutional rules are satisfied, everything is well. If the 
last is the case, the result is that there are in practice no limits to the tasks of the government. Moreover, if a 
majority has to decide, this does have the effect, time and again, of the organizing of majorities to support a 
particular policy: interest groups must be satisfied financially, often at the expense at the expense of minorities. 
A growing government budget and state involvement in the economy is the result.  
For Hayek fiscal rules have to be general; they must be valid for yet unknown future cases. The specific 
effects of following the rules often will not be known to us in advance. They are, in other words, not goal-
directed rules. Just as the traffic rules are not goal-directed rules. We do drive at the right side of the road and we 
do stop for red traffic lights. They give to each of us the possibility to reach our own separate goals. We can 
think of the rule that only proportional taxation is allowed. (As long as the EU does not collect taxes directly 
from the citizens we do speak of the contribution of the several countries.) It is a rule in which both those who 
pay absolutely more and those who pay less probably will agree on. The proportionality rule is a principle. A 
progressive tariff, however, is highly arbitrary.  A majority can grant a minority a deduction, the majority itself, 
however, always must pay the highest tariff. This in contrast to the present situation in which a majority can 
decide to tax a minority more and split the proceedings therof among its own members (Hayek, 1960, pp. 176-
177). In this way everyone knows in advance which part the expenses, if he votes for a particular policy, he and 
those who he represents must carry. A distribution the body that makes the policy cannot alter.   
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
If fiscal dissatisfaction in the EU is the result of a process in which majorities do decide, within that 
framework it can also never be solved. A majority gives differing majority coalitions political authority. A 
majority that in the proposed EU-constitution by means of the European Commission and the European 
Parliament does set the fiscal rules as well as does make policy inside those rules. A solution proposed by Hayek 
is to make a division of the fiscal powers on the basis of principally and constitutionally assigned tasks: a 
legislative and executive branch of government. The establishment of a separate branch of government that does 
state the principles of taxation and hence reform of the EU fiscal constitution is necessary.  
 
This means, paradoxically, not more government, but an active limitation of it. In due course the 
separate “taxation chamber” can grow into an institution where all legislation in the EU is made independently of 
the direct use in policy thereof. In that way we can do justice to what Ben Franklin, one of the framers of the 
American constitution, answered when asked what he had given them. “A limited government, if you can keep 
it!” (Goldwater, 1960, p. 27). 
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